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The Swedish office of Special Parliamentary Commissioner for
the Judiciary and the Civil Administration (Justitieombudsmannadmbetet), after more than a century and a half as a major institution
of Swedish democratic government, has at last become an object of
international interest.1 A similar institution (Militieombudsmannen)
was created in 1915 for the control of Swedish military affairs,'
but no comparable offices were created in any other countries
until after World War I. In 1919 the Civil Ombudsman was copied
by the new Finnish republic which had been established two years
earlier in the former Swedish territories which had been lost to the
Russian Empire in 1809. However, it was not until after the violent
upheavals which shook the West during the Second World War that
the office became a major factor in public debate on the protection of
civil rights and the relation between the individual and the state.
As a result of these debates, the office of Ombudsman was adopted in
Denmark in 1954,' and will soon be adopted in Norway, which
has already established an institution corresponding to the Military
Ombudsman. Suggestions for similar offices have been made in Germany, which created the office of Special Commissioner for Military
Affairs in 1959,4 Great Britain,5 and, most recently, the United States.'
The Soviet Union and each of its constituent republics has a Procurator, whose job includes supervising the administration. A somewhat
similar office is said to function in Indonesia. Thus it is appropriate
to look at the nature of the Swedish institution which was the fountainhead of this present-day development.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The office of Civil Ombudsman originated in the Swedish Constitution of 1809, which aimed at freedom under the rule of law and
was influenced both by the philosophies of Locke and Montesquieu,
then widely accepted in progressive circles in the Western World, and
by older Swedish conceptions and experiences.
Montesquieu and the Separation of Powers
To some extent, the separation of powers advocated by iontesquieu was put into effect in the Swedish Constitution of 1809. In
the justificatory statements made when that constitution was adopted,
it was declared that the intention of the framers had been to create
"a governing power, active within predetermined forms . . . , a leg-

islative power wisely avoiding haste in action but firm and strong in
resistance, and a judicial power independent under the laws but not
dominant over them." ' However, the office of Ombudsman is antagonistic to the strict doctrine of separation of powers, for the Estates of
the Realm created in the Ombudsman an instrument to control not
only the administration, but the judiciary, with an implied power of
limited intervention in the field of legislation. Nevertheless, the office
can be said to be compatible with the ideas of Montesquieu insofar as
that philosopher valued having certain authorities to see that the
three main powers do not overstep their boundaries.
Swedish Antecedents
While the Constitution of 1809 was marked by the philosophy
of the day, the provision for an office of Ombudsman was even more
strongly affected by institutions which had grown up in Sweden during
the preceding centuries. Thus, under earlier constitutions the popular
representatives in the Estates of the Realm had frequently exercised
power over the government and the civil administration, as when Parliament had acted as a court-often in actions of a political natureand when the Estates had set up special tribunals. But the office of
Ombudsman represented a marked departure from such methods, which
had fallen into disrepute as a result of numerous abuses and which
were, moreover, clearly in conflict with the reformist doctrine of separation of powers. For the Ombudsman was to serve the interest of
the Estates only to the extent that, as an officer elected by Parliament,
he could institute proceedings against officials and judges; but the
7
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trial of these actions was to be before the general courts, which were
largely independent of Parliament. The latter factor has become less
important as the Ombudsman has acquired sanctions of his own; but
this evolution has been accompanied by the development of a new
theory that civil liberties are better protected by institutions, such as
the Ombudsman, which are directed specifically at this end, than by
the separation of powers.
Although the office of Ombudsman was a departure from earlier
devices for direct parliamentary control of the administration, the
office was not entirely without historical precedent. It is possible that
the thoughts of the framers went back to the tribuni plebis of ancient
Rome.' The medieval kingdom of Aragon had a justiciate whose
function was to protect private citizens against abuses of the law on
the part of officials. Similar institutions were recommended in 16th
century monarchomachic treatises which were well known to Swedish
thinkers of the 18th century.
It seems even more likely that the office of Civil Ombudsman
found the prototype for its peculiar characteristics in the Attorney
General (Justitiekansler), a domestic official who was empowered to
supervise the application of the law by judges and other officials and
whose office had long been a part of the royal administration. And,
while the Attorney General had normally been in the executive branch
of the government, as he is today, it is interesting to note that during
the 18th century Parliament occasionally succeeded in gaining a measure
of control over the office. Thus in 1739 the Attorney General was
forced to submit a report on his activities to the Estates; and from
1766 to 1772, Parliament exercised power of appointment to the office.
At the same time, the Attorney General was gaining the prerogative
to decide when to bring prosecutions, thereby attaining some of the
independence which characterizes the office of Ombudsman. However, after the Attorney General became a royal appointee once more,
it grew clear that his dependent status could have harmful consequences from the point of view of the public and, particularly, of the
Parliament. This development probably explains Parliament's claim
to an Ombudsman of its own, independent of the executive with regard
to appointment, remuneration, and decisions, and reporting only to
Parliament.
The institution of the Ombudsman cannot be understood except
against the background of the long Swedish evolution toward a society
bound by the rule of law but administered by a bureaucracy-a system
SThis was suggested in the Estate of Burgesses in the debates on the Constitution of 1809.
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which developed differently from either continental absolutism or
Anglo-American parliamentarianism in the 18th century and which
has produced valuable and original results in many areas. As an element of this evolution, it has long been a leading principle of Swedish
constitutional law that the civil administration and the judiciary should
be conducted not by periodically elected officers but by appointed
career officials who hold office until they reach pensionable age. These
public servants early acquired a security of tenure which can be broken
only by a legal finding of dereliction of duty.' Adequate control of
the bureaucracy has been a necessary complement to this irremovability, and it has appeared especially desirable that this control should
emanate from Parliament, which is free from the duties and loyalties
of the bureaucracy. The functions of the Ombudsman are part of a
network of controls which include the right of citizens to have access
to all public documents with certain statutory exceptions designed for
the protection of public and private information which is rightly secret,
the power of private individuals to institute proceedings against officials for faults committed in the exercise of their duties, and the concomitant personal liability of officials for damages in cases where
prejudice to the interests of private citizens has resulted from dereliction of duty.
OUTLINES OF THE OFFICE

In describing an institution so unfamiliar to American readers as
is the Swedish Ombudsman, it seems wise to begin by outlining the
sources of the Ombudsman's authority, the rules governing his election,
qualifications, and jurisdiction, the procedural rules applicable to his
office, and the volume and variety of cases which come before him.
Sources of Authority and Control
The office of Ombudsman, as has been stated, is a creature of the
Swedish Constitution Act of 1809.0 Articles 96 to 100 of that instrument set out the basic framework of the office in its important function
as an independent prosecutor of judges and officials. Articles 101 to
106 describe the position of the Ombudsman as the prosecutor in
actions of impeachment brought by the Parliament. Finally, article
9 See jigerskibld, Swedish State Officials and Their Position Under Public Law

and Labour Law, in 4 ScANDANAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 103 (Schmidt ed. 1960).

10 The Swedish Constitution consists of the REGERINGSFORMEN [constitution] of

1809 and three fundamental laws (grundlagarna): the SUCCESSIONSORDNINGEN [law

of succession] of 1810, the RIKSDAGSORDNINGEN [organic law of the Parliament] of

1866, and the

TRYCKFRIHETSFORORDNINGEN

[law of the freedom of the press] of 1949.

These four acts are printed in English in RoYAL MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
THE CONSTITUTION OF SwEDEN (Thorelli ed. 1945).
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68 of the Parliament Act of 1866 gives rules for the election of the
Ombudsman and the procedure to be followed in case of his resignation.
In addition to these constitutional provisions, certain instructions
passed by Parliament and approved by the King serve to define further
the scope of the Ombudsman's functions." Thus, by instructions Parliament has set the size of the Ombudsman's staff, has required him to
keep his office open and manned by qualified personnel in his absence,
and has described the procedure to be followed in the submission and
prosecution of complaints. Since the Swedish constitutional acts are
very difficult to alter, the device of instructions has provided a practical
means by which Parliament has been able to amend and expand the
scope of the Ombudsman's functions. For example, instructions established the principle that the Ombudsman should not be bound as a
prosecutor by legalistic rules but should have principal regard for the
intentions of officials and the security of the citizenry. It might even
be suggested that Parliament has used instructions to authorize the
Ombudsman to take action quite alien to that which was originally
intended by the framers of the office. Thus, the Ombudsman is permitted by an instruction to "warn" officials instead of prosecuting
them."2
Election and Qualifications
The Ombudsman and his deputy are elected to four-year terms
by a special committee of forty-eight members of the Parliament."3
The same men are frequently reelected for several terms. Either Ombudsman may resign or be dismissed by Parliament at any time during
his term of office,' 4 in which case his deputy assumes the office until
Parliament elects a new Ombudsman, at which time a new deputy is
also elected.' 5 A special procedure is provided for the election of a
deputy when Parliament is not in session.' 6
The qualifications of the Civil and Military Ombudsmen are quite
simply described in the constitution: "known legal ability and outstanding integrity." 17 As a matter of fact, prominent judges have usually
been chosen to fill the office.
1" The instructions are officially published in Svensk fdrfattnngssamlng.
12 See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
13 RIKSDAGSORDNINGEN art. 68.
14
15

REGEUNGSFORMEN arts. 97, 98.
RGERINGSFORMEN art.

98.

16 Ibid.
17

R EGERINGSFORMEN art.

96.
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Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the two Ombudsmen consists of supervising
"the observance of the laws and statutes" and is exercised "in the
capacity of representatives of Parliament," according to instructions
by Parliament."8 The Military Ombudsman, as his name suggests,
is confined to overseeing the administration of laws concerning military matters; the Civil Ombudsman supervises "the observance of laws
and statutes as applied in all other matters by the courts and by public
officials and employees."'" The Ombudsmen have power to prosecute
"those who, in the exercise of their official duties, have through partiality, favoritism, or other cause committed any unlawful act or neglected
to perform their official duties properly." 20 In so doing, the Ombudsmen are "subject in all respects to the same responsibility and obligation as are prescribed for public prosecutors by general civil and criminal laws and the laws of procedure." 21 In carrying out their duties,
the Ombudsmen are authorized to sit in on the deliberations of any
Swedish court or any administrative board instituted to replace the
appellate courts, but may not express their opinions on these occasions.
The Ombudsmen similarly have access to the records of all courts,
administrative boards, and public offices. In the course of his work,
the Civil Ombudsman has the power to inspect prisons, hospitals, and
like institutions.
Supervision of Municipal Governments
In 1957 the Ombudsman's jurisdiction was extended to municipal
governments,2 2 which were formerly considered to fall outside of the
state organization, to which the Ombudsman's control is restricted by
the constitution. However, in entrusting this important new area of
competence to the Ombudsman, Parliament directed him to have due
regard for the municipalities' right to self-administration.2 3 Thus it
may be hoped that a balance has been struck between the desire for
local self-government and the need for the Ombudsman's supervision
of the increasing number of governmental functions which are being
performed at the municipal level. Two hundred and eighteen cases
concerning purely municipal officials have been handled by the Ombudsman in the three years during which he has exercised this new
18 Ibid.
19 REGERINGSFORMEN

art. 96.

20

Ibid.

2

EICNGSFMEN art. 96.
Instruction No. 24.5, [1957] Svensk f6rfattningssamling.
Instruction No. 24.5, § 9, [1957] Svensk f6rfattningssamling.

1
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function. The number has increased from 58 in 1958 to 85 in 1960.24
The great majority of these cases concerned the Children's Welfare
Act and the Alcohol Act, acts in whose enforcement local authorities
have great powers, extending to compulsory measures. The other
main area in which the Ombudsman has been concerned with the
actions of local authorities is that of building and housing policy.
Exemption of Governmental Activity
There are two major areas of governmental activity which lie
outside the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, and in which he is incompetent
to investigate or prosecute. The first concerns government corporations, which are not considered to be organs of the government under
Swedish law. The second and more important concerns the Government itself; that is to say, the ministers are outside the Ombudsman's
jurisdiction. This limitation is less important in Sweden than it
would be in most parliamentary countries, because in Sweden the
ministers do not supervise the various administrative departments of
the government. Rather, the bureaucracy operates free from supervision by particular ministers but subject to control by the whole
Government. Thus, except in those cases in which appeal from an
administrative ruling can be taken to the Government, the Ombudsman has clear jurisdiction over the highest officials who may decide a
matter. But this jurisdiction is seriously limited by the principle that
the Government itself can ultimately hear appeals from most administrative decisions. When the Government actually does decide an
appeal, the Ombudsman is certainly foreclosed from any further action.
But what of his power to act in cases in which the parties have not yet
appealed to the Government but still have the opportunity, particularly
when it is obvious what action the Government would take in deciding
the appeal? The first holders of the office appear sometimes to have
levelled criticisms against administrative authorities who had acted
according to pronouncements of the Government or its probable wishes,
in this way trying to control Government action by indirect means. On
the other hand, later Ombudsmen seem to have maintained the opposite
attitude, taking care not to intervene against any administrative decision
until it was clear that the matter would not be referred to the Government. Most recently, however, there have been indications that the
Ombudsman no longer feels bound to avoid conflicts with the Government but is willing to intervene in cases which can be appealed to the
Government.
24

as J.O

See

JUSTITIEOMBUDSMANNENS AMBETSBERATTELSE

REPORT].

1961, at 444 [hereinafter cited
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Jurisdictional Conflicts
Since the Ombudsman is but one prosecutor among many in the
Swedish constitutional system, questions of the division of competence
between his office and the offices of Attorney General and Public Prosecutor, for example, are likely to arise. Nevertheless, it cannot be said
that any great problems have developed in practice. For the Ombudsman is limited to the prosecution of certain important faults, and
the theoretical area of conflict is therefore limited. And even in this
area, if another prosecutor has already instituted proceedings, the
Ombudsman has traditionally abstained from action, so that open
disputes over the exercise of this concurrent jurisdiction have seldom
occurred. A more complicated question is raised by the existence of a
negative conflict of competence, that is, by the Ombudsman's discovery
in the course of his investigation that the fault which he has found
does not fall within his jurisdiction. Here, according to the constitution, the Ombudsman may notify the Attorney General of the matter.2 5
However, this procedure has seldom been followed. Rather, the Ombudsman has become a prosecutor of equal importance with the others,
so that if he does not institute proceedings, often no action at all is
taken.
Procedure
There are two means by which matters may come to the attention
of the Ombudsman. First, he pays particular attention, in the course
of his inspections of courts, prisons, and administrative authorities, to
all matters which concern deprivation of liberty; similarly, he may
hear of abuses through the public press. Second, in addition to those
matters which he investigates sua sponte, the Ombudsman obtains information from complaints by dissatisfied members of the public.
According to the applicable instructions, these complaints must be in
writing and, whenever possible, accompanied by appropriate evidence.
Once the Ombudsman decides to investigate a complaint, he
seeks information from the responsible officials or calls on them to
explain their actions. Officials in positions of superior authority are
obliged to express their opinions of subordinates to the Ombudsman,
and every official is under a duty to give the Ombudsman accurate information in answer to his requests. In case of refusal, the Ombudsman may prosecute the official and demand the imposition of a fine.
On the basis of the information which he gleans in his investigation,
the Ombudsman may prosecute an official whose conduct has been
25 REGERINGSFORMEN

art. 99.
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faulty, criticize the official either directly or in his report to Parliament,
or take no action at all. The only limitation on the Ombudsman's
choice of sanctions is that he cannot prosecute an official for any offense
without first giving him a chance to explain his conduct.
Sources and Subject Matter of Cases
Some idea of the scope and character of the Ombudsman's work
may be gained by an examination of the cases considered by him in
1960. The cases totalled 1,225, of which 983 originated in complaints
by private citizens, 15 were taken up by the Ombudsman on his own
initiative after they had been reported in the public press, 211 arose
out of the Ombudsman's inspections, and 16 grew out of questions
which had been raised concerning the organization of the office of
the Ombudsman. The cases ranged in subject matter: 210 concerned
the courts; 123, the public prosecutors; 190, the police; 40, executive
authorities; 111, prisons; 91, mental hospitals; 27, other hospitals;
35, tax authorities; 78, municipal officials; 20, church authorities; 8,
state monopolies; 20, the schools; 24, care of alcoholics; 29, children
and youth welfare; 31, the use of real property (building, rental policy,
and land surveying); 118, government or private corporations (which
fall outside the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and thus could not be
handled by him) ; and a large scattering pertained to other administrative authorities. A total of 1,218 cases were disposed of in 1960.
Only eight of them resulted in prosecutions and two in disciplinary
measures against officials. By contrast, in five cases the Ombudsman
made demands for government action and in 271 others he gave condemnatory opinions of the actions investigated. Finally, 669 cases led
to investigations but no other action and 263 were found not to merit
even an inquiry. These figures show some difference in emphasis
between the Swedish Ombudsman and the Danish.26 The Swedish
Ombudsman instigates a far greater proportion of his investigations
sua sponte than does the Danish. On the other hand, it is clear
that, although the Swedish Ombudsman is empowered to prosecute erring officials, in both nations the normal sanction of the
Ombudsman is the condemnatory opinion. Finally, it seems apparent that the Swedish Ombudsman investigates a far greater proportion of the complaints which are brought to him and finds reason
to condemn the practices complained of in many more cases than does
the Danish Ombudsman. While differences in the jurisdiction of the
two Ombudsmen and the statistics available about the two offices make
26 See Christensen, supra note 3 at 1105.
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comparison difficult, it seems safe to suggest that the fact that more
complaints merit inquiry and condemnation in Sweden may result from
a better popular knowledge in that country, gained by over 150 years
of experience with the institution, as to which activities on the part of
government officials are likely to be condemned by the Ombudsman.
The Military Ombudsman handled up to 1,100 cases annually
in the first few years that his office existed, but this number has now
come to average about 600. In 1960, 638 new affairs came to the
Military Ombudsman's attention. Of these, only 79 resulted from
complaints by private citizens, 24 were originated by other authorities,
522 were the result of the Ombudsman's own inspections, and 13 concerned the organization of the Ombudsman's office. Of the cases closed
by the Military Ombudsman in 1960, six concluded in prosecutions;
198, in condemnatory opinions; and 117, in no action at all. Six were
dismissed as unfounded and 228 were dropped after investigation.
Three cases were sent to other authorities, four were revoked, and in
nine cases the dossiers were forwarded to the Government. In 101
cases the claimant got some other form of satisfaction. The Military
Ombudsman has intervened in cases involving unjustified punishment
of subordinates, violation of the rules of due process, action taken by
officers beyond their jurisdiction, unfounded blame, rude behavior,
unjust accusations, and interference with the private lives of subordinates. Other cases have centered on the distinction between orders
for military service and orders for punishment, and the dividing line
between military duties and the misuse of personnel for the private
benefit of officers. Often freedom of speech and press have been set
aside by the military authorities-for instance, through punishments for
giving information to newspapers or for writing newspaper articleseven though the law on freedom of the press not only forbids such
punishment, but makes it illegal to investigate the activities of the
authors. Other questions have concerned more specific rules promulgated to protect the security of personnel, such as the regulations
governing shooting under difficult winter conditions.
SANCTIONS

In classical legal terms, it is perhaps inaccurate to speak of the
Ombudsman as applying sanctions. Nevertheless, it is convenient to
consider the Ombudsman's power to institute prosecutions and to give
condemnatory opinions of the actions of officials whose conduct he
has investigated as an alternative to the sanctions used by courts or
administrative superiors in disposing of cases.
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The Ombudsman as Public Prosecutor
The Civil Ombudsman serves two prosecutory functions. First,
he is the prosecutor in actions of impeachment brought by the Constitutional Committee of Parliament against members of the Supreme Court,
the Supreme Administrative Court, or the Council of State. This
function, while theoretically of the highest order, is really of little
importance in understanding the position of the Ombudsman, since he
cannot initiate such actions; moreover, the Ombudsman has had no
occasion to perform this function since 1853.
The second area in which the Ombudsman acts as prosecutor
concerns faults of judges and officials other than members of the
Council of State. In this area, he prosecutes on his own initiative,
subject only to the duty of submitting an annual report to Parliament.
Although the Ombudsman is bound to respect the decisions of courts
in actions which he prosecutes, and it is considered a breach of tact for
his report to Parliament to criticize the courts for their disposition of
cases prosecuted by him,2" if a court dismisses an action prosecuted by
the Ombudsman, and he finds that the court was at fault in so doing, in
theory he may prosecute the members of the court, although this has
never happened.2
The main outlines of the Ombudsman's power as a public prosecutor have already been given in the discussion of his jurisdiction.
But it is important to note that while, in principle, the Ombudsman's
authority is comparable to that of the prosecuting officers who are subordinate to the Government, in fact, owing to the manner of his appointment and the prestige which his office has won, the Ombudsman
enjoys a greater independence, which enhances the importance of the
prosecutions that he brings and renders the mere threat of prosecution
by the Ombudsman a more substantial sanction than similar threats by
any other prosecuting authority. Nevertheless, in classical legal terms,
the sanctions which attend a prosecution by the Ombudsman are actually in the hands of the courts.
Opinions of the Ombudsman
It is easy to fit the prosecuting function of the Ombudsman into
the Swedish constitutional system. But theoretical difficulties of considerable magnitude are presented by the Ombudsman's practice of
giving his opinion on the acts of judges and civil servants without
resorting to prosecution. This practice, which has no support in the
27 An outstanding and often criticized breach of this rule is found in MnrIrlmomBUDSMANNENS AMBETSBERTTELSE 1961, at 66 [hereinafter cited as M.O. REPORT].
28 This idea was discussed once, in 1916. First Law Committee Report No. 1,

at 7 (1916).
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constitution, was developed by the Ombudsman on his own initiative
and is probably an outgrowth of the Ombudsman's unfettered discretion to prosecute or refrain from prosecuting an official who has been
at fault. When the Ombudsman's investigations have revealed faults
for which prosecution of the responsible official would not be the wisest
solution,"9 it has been an easy step for him to inform the official that
certain actions were faulty, but to withhold prosecution, especially if
the official has agreed to take adequate measures to correct the fault.
A further extension of this practice has been for the Ombudsman to
express similar opinions in his annual report to Parliament, thereby
subjecting the officials mentioned not only to private criticism by the
Ombudsman but also to reprimand in an official document. That the
Ombudsman has assigned great importance to these condemnatory
opinions can be seen from the fact that in his annual reports the cases
in which such opinions have been delivered have long been described
as matters which have led not to prosecution but to "other measures."
Although this practice began at an early date without producing
any reaction in Parliament, it has not gone without criticism. For
when the Ombudsman institutes proceedings, his viewpoint is subject
to judicial examination, and the final decision on the matter of fault
lies with the courts; but when the Ombudsman chooses to give his
opinion without resorting to prosecution, there is no chance for the
courts to review the decision. Thus it can be said that the Ombudsman has encroached on areas which are the natural preserve of the
judge and the legislator. Even today one cannot say with confidence
that the Ombudsman has kept this practice of criticizing faults within
reasonable bounds. Criticisms and attempts to check this practice
have stressed that the constitution made the Ombudsman a prosecutor
and not a judge or interpreter of law. Indeed, the Ombudsman himself stated in 1871 that he could "only prosecute, not directly give the
complainant a remedy or impose a penalty on the culprit." " Later
criticism was expressed in Parliament by Rudolf Kjell6n, an eminent
professor of political science. His attack was based on the reformist
conservative constitutional view that "unless it is otherwise expressly
prescribed, the Royal Civil Administration shall be an autonomous
body under the surveillance of the King." " Kjell6n referred especially
29 For example, if the official concerned has admitted that he acted wrongly, the
Ombudsman may decide that the action was due to an oversight and that it is not likely
to be repeated. On the other hand, when the official refuses to admit his error, raising
a likelihood that the offense will be repeated, or when the fault is of a more serious
nature, the Ombudsman should always prosecute, although this rule has not been
consistently followed.

30 1871 J.0. REPoRT 122.
3

lRiksdagen protokoll vid lagtima vnitet ar 1911.
at 12 (1911).

F6rsta Kammaren.

No. 4,
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to the articles of the constitution which enshrine the doctrine of separation of powers. The comments of the Ombudsman, he said, were an
endroachment on the disciplinary sphere of the civil service, and his
interpretations of the law were an intrusion on the legislative powers of
Parliament and the King. Kjell6n suggested that the Ombudsman had
quite improperly set himself up as a source of law beyond that constituted by legislation and judicial precedents.
Nevertheless, far from taking this criticism to heart, in 1915 Parliament adopted a new instruction legalizing the Ombudsman's informally developed procedure of commenting to judges and civil servants
on their conduct.3 2 Although it was emphasized in this connection
that the Ombudsman should only make general comments, he has
continued to make comments of a more particular nature. On several
occasions there have been reactions against this practice in the Parliament. Members have been critical of the fact that the Ombudsman
has reprimanded officials, has given them directions for dealing with
the matters investigated in what he believed was the proper way, and
has abstained from prosecution in cases where the official has accepted
the Ombudsman's opinion, thereby precluding any judicial examination
of his censures-which is the proper constitutional solution.
These doubts have been particularly strong concerning the practice which the Ombudsman has developed of expressly telling officials
what they must do in order to avoid prosecution. For instance, there
are several cases in which the Ombudsman has condemned a certain
procedure and yet agree& not tO prosecute the responsible dpg l if he
would compensate the aggrieved individual for the damages he caused,
sometimes actually stating how much compensation must be paid. 3
It can hardly be denied that in such cases the Ombudsman is acting
as both prosecutor and judge, an unfortunate combination from many
points of view. The present author has noted instances in which this
procedure has driven judges to disavow their own opinions in cases
which they have decided. 34 In the most extreme case, after the Ombudsman had stated that he would abstain from prosecuting the judges
of a court of appeals if they would pay compensation to a citizen whose
case they had decided (wrongly, it was said), the judges informed
the Ombudsman that while they adhered to their earlier opinion, they
would voluntarily pay the damages demanded because they did not
want to be subjected to the inconvenience of a prosecution. Thus
we have the remarkable outcome that qualified judges of an appellate
32

33

1nstruction No. 133 § 3, [1915] Svensk frfattningssamling.
See 1953 J.0. REPoRT 298.

342:2 JGERSCIOLD, SvEl sl

TiXNsTEmANxARXTT

70 (1960).
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court were forced to submit to consequences which only an adverse
judgment on their conduct should have produced, despite the fact that
the judges held fast to an opinion contrary to that of the Ombudsman.
While one cannot be sure that a court would have decided the question
of law at issue in the same way as the Ombudsman, at the same time
one cannot help but be critical of the judges for declining to put their
stoutly maintained opinion to the test of further litigation.
The somewhat disturbing fact that both the Civil and the Military
Ombudsmen can attach the stigma of a reprimand to an official without
his having any opportunity to secure examination of the question by a
court results from the principle of Swedish law that a civil servant has
no power to force the prosecutor to institute legal proceedings against
his wish, just as an acquitted defendant cannot appeal from a statement
in the ratio decidendi that is critical of him. 35 Thus, to the extent that
the Ombudsman succeeds in compelling obedience without recourse
to prosecution, the measures taken by him often imply a setting aside
of the courts and constitute a considerable power of final legal interpretation vested in the office of the Ombudsman.
The Swedish Ombudsman does not go beyond these practices in
supervising the administration without resorting to judicial proceedings. It should be added that the even wider scope of informal powers
given to the Danish Ombudsman 6 seems alien to Swedish ideas, in
view of the criticism levelled at the more limited practices in Sweden.

Use of Sanctions
In evaluating the Ombudsman's decisions to prosecute, give a condemnatory opinion, or take no action whatever, it must be remembered
that the Ombudsman's office is an old one and that the decisions which
have been rendered by a series of Ombudsmen over the past 150
years have generally been wisely made. Nevertheless, the office cannot be justly appraised without some understanding of the abuses to
which it is subject.
When the Ombudsman decides to prosecute, the only possible
grounds for objecting to his decision are that he has acted from improper motives or that he has seriously overestimated his chances for
success in the action. It is difficult to find a case in which the Ombudsman has instituted proceedings from an improper motive, and, since
the final decision in these cases lies with the courts, such a prosecution
is unlikely to result in much more than inconvenience to the person
:35 See Public Prosecutor v. Lundvall, [1957] Nytt Jurildiskt Arldv 213; Public
Prosecutor v. Persson, [1946] Nytt Juridiskt Arldv 431.
36 See Christensen, supra note 3 at 1115.
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prosecuted.3 7 And, although the Ombudsman has clearly taken
cases to court which he had no prospect of winning, it is hard to
condemn the Ombudsman for this, since the bulk of these cases
have been actions brought to assure private citizens who believed
they had been wronged the extra support which an action by the Ombudsman provides, even though the Ombudsman himself may have had
considerable doubts as to the merits of the claim, or proceedings instituted by the Ombudsman in good faith and reason which have failed
because of the conservatism of the courts.3 In fact, if one wishes to
criticize the courts of earlier times, there are certainly grounds for
assuming that feelings of bureaucratic solidarity were allowed to motivate too many judgments which went against the Ombudsman. It is
easier to find material for criticizing the Ombudsman in cases where
he has declined to prosecute clear derelictions of duty. One example
may be taken from a recent case in which the Ombudsman decided not
to prosecute a judge who had called upon a witness to give statements
prejudicial to himself, despite a clear prohibition against such demands
in Swedish law. In his annual report, the Ombudsman explained his
decision not to prosecute by stating that the fault had been committed
through ignorance of the law. 9 When questioned further by the
Parliamentary Committee on Legislation, he elaborated that the circumstances showed the fault was not so egregious that he should not
exercise his discretion to abstain from prosecution, since the judge had
erred merely from ignorance and not because of a wrong intent 40
This case illustrates both the Ombudsman's freedom from the legal
duty to institute proceedings against all illegal actions which binds the
other prosecuting officials under Swedish law and a questionable use
of that freedom.
Clearly, the area in which the Ombudsman's discretion is most
liable to abuse is where he resorts to condemnatory opinions instead
of prosecutions. Here the Ombudsman operates without benefit of
judicial review of his judgments and is limited by the small size of
the staff which aids him in determining the correct view of the law.
The risks which undoubtedly exist are perhaps best illustrated by a
recent case in which the Ombudsman criticized a court executive offi37
One possible exception to this statement lies in those cases where the Ombudsman has used the threat of the inconvenience of defending against a prosecution to
force officials to comply with his view of the law. Cf. text accompanying note 34

sipra.
J.O.

38 See Public Prosecutor v. Palm,
REPORT 172; 1917 J.O. REPORT 313.

89 See 1957 J.O.

REPORT

[1910]

Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 407;

1919

182.

On the basis of this elaboration, the Committee on Legislation accepted the
Ombudsman's view of the case. First Law Committee Report No. 1 (1957).
40
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cer for having attached certain property illegally.41 The officer obeyed
the Ombudsman's directions and released the property. But, due to a
serious oversight, the Ombudsman's interpretation of the law had been
patently erroneous. The Ombudsman had no choice but to provide
compensation out of his own pocket for the damages caused.'
Fortunately, the damages were minimal; but one cannot help but ask what
would have happened had the damage exceeded the Ombudsman's
ability to pay.
The dangers inherent in a decision to render a condemnatory
opinion in lieu of prosecuting an official are accentuated by the fact
that the Ombudsman often makes it a condition of not prosecuting
that the criticized official compensate for damages caused to a citizen
wronged by his actions.4 3 While personal liability for damages caused
by officials in the course of their duties is an integral part of Swedish
law, it seems a particularly dangerous sanction for the Ombudsman to
apply, for there can be no review of his use of the sanction in particular
cases save through examination by the Parliamentary Committee on
Legislation when such matters appear in the Ombudsman's annual
report.
INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGISLATION

The Ombudsman's early annual reports to the Estates were very
short, containing only accounts of prosecutions instituted and decisions
of the courts on those prosecutions. However, in the course of time
it became the practice of the Ombudsman to include a discussion of
other important matters with which he had dealt but which had not
led to prosecutions. This material soon came to occupy the greater
portion of the reports. In recounting these matters, the Ombudsman
has naturally felt impelled to explain why he abstained from prosecution, but he has often gone on to express his own view on the procedures of the judges and officials and to give his considered interpretation of the statutes involved in the cases. As a result of the authority
attaching to the Ombudsman's office in Sweden, these pronouncements
have attracted general attention. Although they are not legally binding on courts or administrators, and it is generally realized that they
may be erroneous and that a court may disavow them, a certain presumption exists that these interpretations are correct. The annual
reports of the Ombudsman are carefully studied as evidence of the
law. Thus, although it is not in itself a fault to act contrary to these
opinions, it is nevertheless true that if an official can show that he has
41 1957 J.O. REPORT 175.
42 See First Law Committee Report No. 1 (1957).
43 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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acted in accordance with such a statement by the Ombudsman, he has
a considerable chance of being absolved from blame.
The situation resulting from these statements on the law can
hardly be regarded as satisfactory. It is conceded that both Ombudsmen may often have reason to make pronouncements of general scope
in connection with the concrete questions into which they have inquired. In 1907 Berndt Hasselroth, a prominent Ombudsman, instituted the practice of collecting such statements in a special section of
his report headed "Comments Concerning the Administration of Justice." This practice was abandoned for a time but was resumed by
the Ombudsmen at the request of Parliament in 1949-50. 44 Since
then, both Ombudsmen have given criticisms, directions, and interpretations, in summary form, concerning, for example, the new code of
civil procedure, the evidentiary value of blood tests in proving drunken
driving, and the application of the Conditional Sentences Act by the
courts. The Parliamentary Committee on Legislation has frequently
emphasized the importance of these summaries as instruments for
correcting and setting standards for judicial practice; 4' and the Committee has added further weight to them by approving the annual reports. It cannot be denied that these summaries may be of great value.
On the other hand, one cannot refrain from a certain skepticism since
this source of interpretation of the law which has been built up along
side of the more traditional interpretations cannot help but have drawbacks. Such a proliferation of views on the law can result in confusion; and sometimes the Ombudsman has actually made major
errors in his interpretations of the law. One remarkable failure was
his attempt to inaugurate a power in the courts to examine the constitutionality of laws, 40 a conception which, though familiar in the United

States and in neighboring Norway, is quite alien to Swedish jurisprudence. Or, to take a well-known recent example, the Ombudsman
sought to maintain as a part of a criticism of a judge who was not
prosecuted, that judges are absolutely bound by precedents of the
Supreme Court in pleno.47

In this case the Parliamentary Committee

on Legislation countered by declaring that under Swedish law a judge
is not absolutely bound by decisions of the Supreme Court, even if
44 See First Law Committee Report No. 1 (1949). See also First Law Committee Report No. 1 (1948). For a similar parliamentary request to the Military
Ombudsman, see First Law Committee Report No. 2, at 12 (1950); First Law
Committee Report No. 2, at 8 (1951).
45 See First Law Committee Report No. 4, at 6 (1958).
481851 J.O. REPoRT 8; 1849 J.O. REPORT 18-20.

471947 J.O. REPORT 113.
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in pleno, but must weigh each precedent acthey have been reached
8
4
cording to its merits.

The Ombudsman's report consists of a relatively small number of
cases taken from a large annual practice. This too has created a risk.
On several occasions, the Parliamentary Committee on Legislation
has found it desirable to give publicity to matters other than those
which the Ombudsman has chosen to make known. Thus the Committee has placed a stronger emphasis on matters concerning civil
rights, as in the question of the right of an inmate of a mental hospital
to make representations to the Ombudsman, 49 and has stressed cases
finding shortcomings in judicial procedure when it has thought that
the Ombudsman's criticisms should be more widely known." Sometimes it appears that Parliament has reacted against what it has considered to be undue regard for the susceptibilities of colleagues in the
Ombudsman's report. 51
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LAw

The Ombudsman has made major contributions to the development of Swedish law, particularly in the broad area of civil liberties,
and has been responsible for enforcing high standards of judicial and
administrative procedure. In the early days of his office, the Ombudsman confined his attention largely to the courts, prosecutors, and
prison administration. More recently he has come to pay particular
attention to the civil administration and now to municipal governments. Thus it may be worthwhile to discuss the Ombudsman's contributions to maintaining high standards in these branches of the
government and his more general work in protecting the rights of the
individual from infringement by the government.
The Courts
The control which the Ombudsman has exercised over the courts
has been a major factor in the development and protection of the
rights of individuals to speedy and effective justice. Thus, the Ombudsman has been watchful to see that the maximum times during
which suspects may be kept under arrest are not exceeded, that compulsive means available in criminal procedure are not abused, that
First Law Committee Report No. 1 (1947).
First Law Committee Report No. 1, at 5 (1948).
50 First Law Committee Report No. 3 (1949) ; cf. First Law Committee Report
No. 4 (1958).
51 See First Law Committee Report No. 1, at 5 (1947), in which the Committee
reported the Ombudsman's previously unpublished criticism of a judge who had
insulted persons appearing before his court.
48
49
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the provisions to expedite judicial business are observed, that sentencing is correct, and that the execution of penalties follows the
proper form. Moreover, he has paid considerable attention to the
more personal behavior of the judiciary, for example, by enforcing
the prohibition against judges engaging in other activities while in
office, by seeing to it that judges abstain from handling cases in which
they might be partial, and by promoting generally proper judicial behavior toward the public. Recent cases show that this surveillance
is necessary-that the judicial vocation has its "occupational diseases." 52 However, flagrant cases of maladministration of justice
have long been rare. Although this is in part a product of improved
legislation and judicial training, it is also a reflection of the fact that
it is no longer regarded as a fault for a judge to misinterpret the law
when his mistake can be explained by unclarity in the law itself. Nevertheless, the well-known case of a clearly wrong application of the
codified law of inheritance by the Supreme Court in 1935 5' stands
out as an exception, an unhappy accident.
Administrative Agencies
For a long time, the practice of the Ombudsman was dominated
by matters relating to the administration of justice. This was the result of a combination of factors, the most important of which were the
fact that the Ombudsman has almost always been a high-ranking
judge whose interests have lain in this field, and the fact that administrative activities in Sweden were very limited during the earlier years
of the Ombudsman's office. However, Parliament insisted in 1904
that more attention should be paid to the civil administration"4 and
has consistently adhered to that position ever since. As the Ombudsman has developed this area of activity, new agencies have been created or suggested to undertake complementary action in the same field.
The most notable addition has been the office of Military Ombudsman,
which was first recommended in conjunction with the introduction of
conscription in 1901 and was finally adopted when the size of the
armed forces was increased in 1915; "" thus the office was a result of
new administrative developments. Although proposals for special
52
See 1961 J.0. REPORT 37 (insulting behavior) ; 1959 J.0. REPORT 15 (improper
trial comments).
5
3 Holmlund v. Johanson, [1935] Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 1; 1936 3.0. REPORT 230.
The question was whether a will should be governed by the law which was in effect

when it was executed or by a subsequent law which was in effect when the testator
died.
54 First Law Committee Report No. 1, at 3 (1904).

55 See Fridholm, Militieoinbudszaiunaimbetets uppkomst, in
SVENSKA RIKSDAGENs KoNTROLLMAKT 217

(Brusewitz ed. 1930).
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offices of this kind in such fields as social administration and health
have been rejected, more limited organs of control have been developed. Nevertheless, the tendency to split the Ombudsman's office has
been largely avoided and, outside the field of military affairs, the main
response to developing administrative institutions has been a corresponding increase in the scope of the Civil Ombudsman's jurisdiction."6
The relations of the Ombudsman to the administration were particularly delicate during the two world wars when a number of special
administrative bodies were created which, by the very nature of the
situation, had little experience on which to draw. In both these
periods, especially during the Second World War, the Ombudsmen
were criticized for having too passive an attitude. In 1943 the Parliamentary Committee on Legislation stressed that "in the duty of
the Ombudsman to exercise a general surveillance over the observance
of statutes, regulations, and institutions, there is also included a duty
to protect the rights of the individual and to work with the means at
his disposal to insure that [the customary rules of administrative procedure] . . . are properly maintained in the civil administration." "'
Without doubt, the Ombudsman has shown an increasing activity
vis-A-vis the administration in recent years. I believe that this represents a considerably different development from that followed in Finland thus far. Here it is worth noting that Denmark has copied the
Swedish example 5 and that the greatest interest in the Ombudsman
institution throughout the world today centers on its functions as
overseer of the administrative agencies. In this area, it can be pointed
out that the Swedish Ombudsman has devoted great attention to de56 See Stjernquist, Fragan omn inrittande av nya riksdagens ombudninn, in
STATSVETENSKAPLIG TiDsK ear 320 (1948).
57

First Law Committee Report No. 3, at 4 (1943).

Some examples of cases pecu-

liar to wartime include the action of the military authorities to prevent soldiers from
corresponding with the Military Ombudsman, 1943 M.O. REPORT 70; the forced retirement of an officer who defended the Nazi political system among his fellow officers,
1943 M.O. REPORT 225; and the expropriation of private property for war needs, 1942
M.O. REPORT 169-70. The extent of this wartime strain on the Military Ombudsman
can be seen in the fact that his annual caseload rose from a peacetime average of
about 600 to more than 2,000. The Civil Ombudsman also had increased problems as
a result of export and import regulation, rationing, and other wartime restrictions on
civilian activity. The right to censor mail and telephone conversations provoked the
Ombudsman to protest the confusion of political opinions with espionage, 1945 J.O.
REPORT 167; similarly, the advent of higher wartime taxes led to abuses in tax collection techniques such as failure to respect the doctor-patient privilege in order to get
information on incomes, 1945 J.O. REPORT 152. The Ombudsman was unable to act
in the caise cjlbre of the police action to prevent a theatre from presenting a Norwegian anti-Nazi play. While the action was probably illegal, it was taken at the
decision of the Government and hence fell outside the Ombudsman's jurisdiction.
However, the Ombudsman did express his dissatisfaction at the failure of the police
to put the matter to a court test by prosecuting the theatre owners. 1945 3.0.
REPORT 108.

58 See Christensen, mupra note 3.
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privations of liberty in the social sphere, particularly as to the care of
alcoholics and the administration of hospitals, especially mental hospitals. He has also developed an increasing interest in tax assessments, and has hired special expert assistants for this work. But
the Ombudsman has not limited his activities to such specialized areas
of administrative law. He has also instituted proceedings in cases
where officials have acted beyond their jurisdiction in such fields as
the administration of export regulations and rent control, and he has
investigated matters concerning the legal position of civil servants,
their mode of appointment, the rules for granting them leave, and the
disciplinary measures which may properly be taken against them.
While the recent extension of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction to
include the activities of municipal authorities has, as yet, produced
little in the way of new substantive law or policy-although it is
obvious that in this field the Ombudsman is following the same policy
which he maintains toward administrative agencies-the very fact
that the Parliament made this change indicates a continued flexibility
of the Ombudsman's office in Sweden and an ability to innovate in
the use of that office after 150 years.
Civil Rights
On many occasions, the Ombudsman has been a pioneer in the
field of civil rights, sometimes at the expense of having his prosecutions
dismissed by the more conservative courts. Nevertheless, he has continued to lay special stress on the development of rules about freedom
of assembly, speech, and press, and about access to public documents.
Thus, in 1887 a town council forbade a citizen to speak in public
about the increase in population, although there was no law sanctioning such a restriction; here the Ombudsman successfully prosecuted
the erring officials.59 In 1913 he prosecuted the police, albeit unsuccessfully, for forbidding a political demonstration for parliamentary
reform.60 Similarly, the Ombudsman had five years earlier prosecuted
the police in the same town for prohibiting a political meeting at
which revolutionary socialism was to be discussed.6 1 In this case,
although the majority of the Supreme Court found that the police
action was not legally supportable, it held the action was not punishable. 2 In 1918 members of the town council in another town were
condemned for having prevented a citizen from speaking on "the
59 1891 J.o. REPORT 5; 1889 J.O. REPORT 62.

341.
611911 J.O. REPORT 7; 1910 J.O. REPORT 21.
62
Public Prosecutor v. Palm, [1910] Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 407.
60 1917 J.O. REPORT
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trinity of church, sword, and capital." 63 In many of the areas where
the Ombudsman fought for civil rights the courts have now adopted
his opinions.
The contributions of the Ombudsman as a protector of speech,
belief, and assembly have been particularly noteworthy in periods of
political unrest, as, for example, during the general strike of 1909 and
the two world wars. Nevertheless, in his latest annual report, the
Ombudsman tells of prosecuting a parish clergyman who took it upon
himself to rip down a poster about a Nonconformist meeting.
The free access to public documents where there is no rule of
law making them secret is an ancient legal right in Sweden which the
Ombudsman has struggled to make effective. 5 As early as 1830 the
Ombudsman prosecuted the president of the central board of finance
after he and his subordinates had prevented a citizen from seeing part
of certain documents. Both Ombudsmen have continued to defend
this right, which is of great importance, for example, to persons who
have been dismissed from office and want to inspect the relevant documents. On the other hand, the Ombudsman has also worked to protect the equally important principle that the secrecy of those documents
which are not open to the public must be maintained.
The Ombudsman has kept up a constant defense of the rules
guaranteeing personal security from abuse of the police power. Thus,
an illegal arrest is likely to lead to prosecution of the policeman. 6
This concern for the individual extends to prisoners as well as to
citizens-at-large. Indeed, the efforts made by the Ombudsman to
improve conditions in the prisons have been among the most important benefits of that office, especially during the 19th century. Even
today, the Ombudsman makes periodic inspections of the prisons, and
in the course of the years he has been responsible for great improvement in the treatment and health of prisoners and even in the location
of prisons.
The problems facing the Ombudsman during his 150 years in
office have varied greatly, but his approach to them has remained a
remarkably constant concern for the principles of legality and the
rights of individuals. Thus, in the first two decades of the office the
Ombudsman ended the power of administrative authorities, especially
63

1919 3.0. REPORT 54.

64

1960 J.O. REPORT 153.

65 The TRYCKFRIHETSF6RORDNINGEN

[freedom of the press act] of 1949 is an out-

growth of a series of acts beginning in 1766. Chapters 2 and 3 of the present act
are of particular significance to the discussion here. Two of the principal cases concerning the Ombudsman's application of these rules may be found in 1957 3.0. REPORT
193 and 1958 J.O. REPORT 222.
66 The Ombudsman has not confined himself to cases of flagrant misbehavior.
Even the impolite or rude judge risks prosecution. See 1959 3.0. REPORT 15.
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of provincial governments and diocesan chapters, to regulate activities
by the imposition of fines. Quite recently he has intervened against
an excessive use of the so-called power of local regulation. The Ombudsman has worked continually to defend the integrity of the administration against abuses of official position for political ends-against,
for example, political propaganda by clergymen and military officers,
corruption, abuse of power for personal favors and gain, and the setting aside of the rules of evidence.
A final note might be made of the special contributions of the
Military Ombudsman in exercising strict control over military punishments and the treatment of subordinates and conscripts with respect
to their human rights. This is a field in which it is difficult to strike
a balance between humane considerations and the special demands of
military discipline and efficiency; the Military Ombudsman has moved
with great wisdom in the area.
CONCLUSION

The Civil and Military Ombudsmen have clearly won an unassailable position in Swedish life. To some extent this has been the
result of the valuable contributions which these officers have made to
the development of Swedish law and the protection of civil liberties.
But another factor which has contributed greatly to the development
of the two offices has been the generally fortunate choice of officeholders. The early occupants of both offices were particularly important, and the first Civil Ombudsman, Baron A. Mannerheim, the
granduncle of Finland's great statesman, deserves special mention.
Since he retired there has been a happy alternation between active innovators and conservative administrators which has been most valuable. As a rule, prominent judges have been chosen, and they have
filled the office with distinction. At certain times, consideration has
been given to restricting the freedom of choice so that only persons
independent of the courts and the civil services could be nominated,
but, fortunately, no such restriction has ever been imposed. In a
small country, it would certainly be unfortunate to place such a limit
on the choice of so important an official, particularly since the Ombudsmen have well deserved the confidence which has been shown them.

